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Chapter 4
The Ine%ciency of Health Care 
Rationing—and a Solution
David R. Henderson
The problem of rationing
One of the main problems with a single-payer health care system, such 
as Canada’s Medicare, is that it causes health care to be rationed. Under 
Medicare, the provincial governments negotiate physician compensation 
with provincial medical associations. %e provincial governments typically 
fund hospitals by setting global budgets for government-run regional health 
authorities. For any medical care from doctors or hospitals that is covered 
by Medicare, the government-set price to beneficiaries is zero. %e result is 
a shortage: at any given time, some patients want more medical care than is 
available. %erefore, medical care is rationed; people wait for medical services. 
Government funded systems typically use what doctors call triage to ration 
access to services: the more serious the illness, all else equal, the shorter the 
wait. Nevertheless, there is a wait, and it is often substantial. %ere is often a 
wait even for an appointment with a general practitioner. %e wait between 
an appointment with a general practitioner and a referred appointment with 
a specialist is often weeks or months. %e wait between an appointment with 
a specialist and recommended treatment, which is often a more serious wait, 
is also often weeks or months.¹
 See Barua and Esmail, , for the latest data. Of course, all three waits (and the wait for 
emergency room care) can be serious depending on the condition for which care is being sought. 
A delay for a general practitioner appointment for someone with cancer, for example, can be 
serious because the patient might not learn in time that he or she has cancer.
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To see the shortage of medical services graphically, consider figure .. 
%e line DD is the demand for health care by Canadian residents who are 
covered by Medicare and the line SS is the supply of services provided by 
the health care sector, primarily by physicians. %e equilibrium price in an 
unsubsidized competitive market where users paid the market price for ser-
vices would be Pc. Now introduce a single-payer system under which the gov-
ernment pays doctors PP, which is lower than Pc. Because it is a single-payer 
system under which the government is the payer, the consumer (patient) pays 
P, a price of zero. %e result is that the amount supplied is QP and the amount 
demanded is Q. %e single-payer system thus causes a shortage equal to 
Q – QP. Because the price is kept artificially low—at zero—to obtain medi-
cal care, many patients must wait, often for weeks or months, particularly for 
non-emergent problems. In effect, waiting lists are the instrument that rations 
access to medical services.
Just as rationing by waiting is inefficient when the good being sold 
is gasoline, so also is rationing by waiting inefficient when the service being 
provided is medical care. %e inefficiency takes several forms. First, some 
people will use the health care system simply because there is no use-related 
fee, and the value of their time is low. For example, someone who wakes up 
with a headache that could be treated through self-medication—aspirin, say, 
or Advil—might visit a doctor, and thereby displace someone else with a more 
serious condition but with a relatively tight time schedule. %is is, or could 
be, a relatively innocuous example. A more serious one would be that of a 
patient who badly needs an MRI but who, because of the queue, does not get 
one in time and, as a result, dies.
%e second form of inefficiency is the loss of productive time. %ose 
who wait for medical care that could have alleviated their health problem(s) 
will, in many cases, lose valuable time that could have been used productively. 
For example, someone who needs to wait for cardiovascular surgery is less 
likely to be able to perform on the job than healthier counterparts, or, if able, 
is less likely to be able to work normal hours. Even if the only harm suffered 
is pain and worry, there is a reduction in the individual’s quality of life, if not 
a loss of productive time in the workplace.
Because age is often a criterion for rationing access to medical care, 
the loss of productive time can accumulate over years for some older patients. 
Consider the case of Bill Murray, a -year-old Alberta resident with an 
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arthritic hip. His specialist recommended a “Birmingham” hip resurfacing 
surgery. But the government medical care bureaucracy vetoed the procedure 
on the grounds that Mr. Murray was “too old” to benefit from the procedure,² 
a finding that presumably came as a surprise to Mr. Murray (Esmail, ). 
Unless the bureaucracy reverses itself in such situations, no amount of waiting 
will result in actually getting health care. 
The cost of waiting: An estimate
Two major costs of rationing are the loss of productivity and the pain and 
discomfort that people bear while waiting for medical care. %ese costs will 
vary widely depending mainly on two factors: ) the extent to which waiting 
for care reduces one’s productivity and ) the per-hour value of the foregone 
productivity.
 Mr.  Murray  was  offered  a  lower  quality  (and  apparently  less  expensive)  alternative.  Ultimately,  









Figure 4.1: The shortage as a result of single-payer medical care
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In a study done for the Fraser Institute, health economist Nadeem 
Esmail estimates this element of the cost of waiting for care after seeing a 
specialist (Esmail, ). He notes that in , the median wait for treat-
ment for the , Canadian residents who saw a specialist was . weeks. 
Esmail then does an adjustment according to medical specialty and province, 
and finds that Canadians waited a total of . million weeks for treatment in 
. He cites an estimate by Statistics Canada that . percent of people who 
waited for non-emergency surgery in  reported that the wait “affected 
their life” (Statistics Canada, : ). Assuming that same percentage was 
accurate for , he concludes that the lost time to Canadians from waiting 
for health care was . million weeks.
Esmail then applies the average weekly wage, by province, to this 
estimate of lost time to estimate the monetary value of lost productivity in 
the workplace. %e average weekly wage in  varied from a low of $ 
in Prince Edward Island to a high of $, in Alberta, and the average for 
Canada was $. Using these data, Esmail concludes that the total value of 
lost productivity was $ million. 
At first blush, one might be tempted to argue that this is an overesti-
mate. %ere are two reasons. First, it is possible that the  percent of people 
whose waits “affected their life” were still able to be somewhat productive, and 
so did not lose all their productivity as Esmail’s estimate implicitly assumes. 
Second, because not all medical care is totally effective at eliminating dif-
ficulties caused by various illnesses, some of the  percent would have had 
difficulties anyway. Hence, at least part of the lost productivity, though real, 
should not properly be attributed to waiting for medical care. 
However, three factors working in the opposite direction might cause 
Esmail’s estimate to understate the loss of productive time due to waiting. %e 
most important factor is that pain or disability that hampers productivity will 
also likely hinder the enjoyment of leisure, and leisure is valuable. Indeed, a 
reasonable minimum estimate of the value of an hour of leisure to someone 
is that person’s after-tax hourly wage. %is is because people show by their 
behaviour that they are choosing an extra hour of leisure over an extra hour of 
work, and so they must value that hour of leisure at more than their after-tax 
wage rate. Of course, this assertion assumes that people are free to choose the 
number of hours they work, something that is not literally true in many cases. 
However, the standard -hour week came about for most workers before it 
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was legislated, and so it likely reflects the wishes of the majority of workers. In 
an aggregate sense, therefore, although not for each individual, the length of 
the work week does reflect free choice. %ere are approximately  hours of 
potential leisure in a week, if leisure is defined as not working, and assuming 
a  hour work week. %e result: much of the value of lost time due to waiting 
for medical care is due to the lost value of leisure, and the magnitude of this 
lost value could plausibly be of the same order of magnitude as Esmail’s $ 
million estimate of lost workplace income.
%e second reason Esmail’s $ million estimate could understate the 
value of lost time is that some of the  percent of the people surveyed whose 
wait did not “affect their life” may well still have had some difficulties. Even if 
only one quarter of the  percent had difficulty that was only one quarter of 
the difficulty of the self-assessed people with significant difficulties, it would 
amount to an added difficulty of one sixteenth of  percent, or . percent. 
%is would add another  percent (. percent is half of . percent) to the 
. percent figure underlying Esmail’s estimate.³
%ird and finally, it is not the case that the only loss from waiting for 
health care is lost workplace productivity or lost value of leisure. Pain is a 
loss all its own. One can certainly imagine someone being willing to pay not 
just his weekly wage and his lost value of leisure, but also something more, 
to avoid pain. 
Another shortage-induced loss: Misallocation  
of scarce medical resources
Under a single-payer system, as noted, there is a shortage of medical care. 
Medical care, therefore, tends to be provided to those who are willing to wait, 
assuming that they are not excluded because the government judges them 
to be too old. %is means that medical care is misallocated among patients. 
As noted earlier, the system uses triage. But triage has its own misalloca-
tions, the main one being that the patient himself or herself gets no direct 
say in the setting of priorities. Consider the person—call him Mr. X—who 
badly wants medical care so that he can heal and travel. Assume that he is 
willing to pay $, for it. Of course, under a single-payer system, he is not 
 I  believe  that  Esmail  (2013)  makes  this  same  point  in  a  different  way  in  his  footnote  3.
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allowed to pay. Now consider Mr. Y who has the same condition but who 
values medical care at $. Under the rationing system, there is no assur-
ance that medical care will go to Mr. X rather than Mr. Y. Medical care is 
not allocated efficiently, since the allocation does not reflect the value of the 
care to individual patients.
But couldn’t medical care be allocated first to those who need it most? 
%e problem is in defining “need.” %e person who has a cold and who could 
self-medicate with over-the-counter drugs might see himself as “needing” a 
doctor’s appointment. Because this person pays a zero price, he may well 
go to see a doctor and cost the medical system say, $, even if he values 
the doctor’s services at only $. But in doing so, he might displace another 
potential patient who has a more serious ailment that cannot be cured with 
over-the-counter drugs. Both will compete for the doctor’s time, and, in many 
cases, therefore, a “needs-based” system of rationing would face a difficult 
task in determining, in many instances, who “deserves” priority in receiv-
ing medical care.⁴ In short, the problem of misallocating medical resources 
cannot be solved through the use of a triage system within the context of a 
single-payer system. 
A true single-payer story
An actual example from a single-payer system will illustrate the point. %e sys-
tem I have in mind is not Canada’s but that of the US Navy. I teach economics 
to officers in the US Navy and for one of my students, a doctor at a US Navy 
base in Norfolk, the economics light bulb went on when she connected what 
I was teaching with the following incident.
A -year old child of a US Navy sailor had broken her leg and my 
student put the leg in a cast. She told the parents and child that they should 
make sure they didn’t get the cast wet because then it would be destroyed. A 
week later, the parents brought the child in, asking for another cast. What had 
 Often, individual physicians substitute their own determinations of the value of medical care to 
individual patients. At least one study (from the United Kingdom) suggests that physicians use a 
foregone present value of earnings criterion to guide their allocation of resources. Some Canadian 
evidence supports this finding, revealing that older patients wait longer for some services, even 
though they value their own lives highly.
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happened? %e child had gone to a birthday party where the other children 
had been swimming in a pool. She hadn’t wanted to miss out on swimming 
and so she swam also. Again, the doctor put on a cast. 
%at was not the end. Her parents brought her in a few weeks later 
for another cast because, again, the child had gotten the cast wet. Nor was 
that the end. %is happened a number of times so that, all told, the US Navy’s 
medical system used six casts for one break. 
Why? %e reason is straightforward. %e US Navy has a single-payer 
system in which it, the Navy, is the payer. %e out-of-pocket cost to the par-
ents of what pretty much everyone would regard as irresponsible behavior 
was zero. %e Navy’s medical system bore all the costs. So the parents’ and 
child’s only cost was their time and inconvenience. Presumably, some of the 
times that the child was getting a cast were times when other patients were 
kept waiting. Had the parents been required to pay even, say, $ for the 
next cast, the odds are that they and their child would have been more care-
ful, and the doctors’ time would have been freed up so that they could deal 
with other patients. %us, this true story is an example of a misallocation of 
medical care. 
Admittedly, my example is an extreme one. %e typical case is likely 
less extreme than this Norfolk story. But extreme examples often illustrate and 
drive home important points. And the point here is that there is no assurance 
that under a single-payer system, medical care will go to those who value it 
most. A more mundane example is of the patient who could take Excedrin 
for a headache but, instead, goes to the doctor and gets a diagnosis—and 
Excedrin. %e result will be misallocation of medical care and, therefore, inef-
ficiency. Some people who value medical care a little will get it and some 
people who value medical care highly will not.
A longer term effect of being able to get medical care at a zero price 
is that people will take less care of themselves, indulge in bad habits such as 
over-eating, over-drinking, and smoking, and get too little exercise. %is is 
such a concern that economists and actuaries have a term for it: moral hazard. 
%e term is somewhat misleading: one not need be immoral to engage in moral 
hazard. But the term is a useful one, because it reminds us that incentives 
matter, that if one is insured against a bad outcome, one will take less care to 
avoid the bad outcome.
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An antidote to rationing and ine!ciency: Allow private payment
Canada has one of the most extreme health care systems in the world. Health 
economist John C. Goodman claims that Canada joins Cuba and North Korea 
as the only three countries in the world in which people are not legally allowed 
to pay for health care (Goodman, : ). Although Canada is extreme in 
making the acquisition of health care outside the government system difficult, 
Goodman’s characterization is itself too extreme. Because Medicare is largely 
a provincial program, the regulations vary by province, and generalizations 
are difficult. In only four of the ten provinces (Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland) are people allowed to buy private insurance 
for the kinds of health care provided by the government system.⁵ %ese four 
provinces, moreover, contain less than  percent of the Canadian population. 
Also, although doctors in nine of the  provinces are free to opt out of the 
government system, since , the largest province, Ontario, has prohibited 
doctors from opting out at all if they are providing “medically necessary” care 
(Flood and Haugan, ). %e  Ontario law grandfathered doctors who 
had already opted out but, by , the number of opt-outs in Ontario, a 
province with over , doctors, was only  (Montreal Gazette, February 
, ). In three provinces—Ontario, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia—doc-
tors who opt out must charge fees that are no greater than the allowable 
fees charged by doctors who do not opt out. In five of the seven provinces in 
which doctors are allowed to set their own fees—British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Quebec—provinces that account for over  per-
cent of Canada’s population, government coverage is denied for patients who 
receive services from opted-out doctors. 
Flood and Archibald, in summarizing this complexity circa , write 
that Canada’s health care regulations “seem to have as their primary objective 
preventing the public sector from subsidizing the private sector.” Although 
that is a fairly accurate summary, there are two exceptions, both noted above. 
One is the ban on opt-outs in Ontario since . %e other exception is 
the price controls on opt-out doctors in Manitoba and Nova Scotia. %ese 
restrictions on privately-paid-for health care discourage doctors and hospitals 
from offering health care services to patients outside the Medicare system and 
discourage potential patients from seeking such health care.
 This  information  is  taken  largely  from  Flood  and  Archibald,  2001.
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I propose, therefore, a number of changes to allow more privately-
paid-for health care. %e main changes are: 
1 allowing doctors and hospitals that provide health care to price 
without government price controls; 
2 allowing people to buy private insurance that offers coverage for 
“medically necessary” health care; and 
3 allowing doctors and hospitals that are paid by government also to 
provide medical care to paying customers. 
People should be allowed to use their own money to buy medical care directly, 
and they should be allowed to use their own money to buy privately-provided 
health insurance that then pays for medical care, whether that medical care 
is sold by providers completely outside Medicare or by providers who also 
practice within Medicare. 
I propose this solution because I believe that people should not be 
prevented from spending their own money on health care. Just as our bod-
ies are our own, so our other resources are our own, and we should be able 
to spend these other resources on our bodies or, for that matter, on helping 
obtain medical care for other people whom we care about. 
Of course, care should be taken to ensure that doctors and hospitals 
who engage in “dual practice” are charging paying patients the full cost of the 
health care that they provide to those patients. %at way, the government 
would not be subsidizing paying patients. 
Notice what these policy changes would mean for patients to whom the 
current system rations health care. People who do not want to wait for medical 
care would be able to use their own money or their own health insurance to 
buy care from willing health care providers. %ose who would choose to buy 
such care would probably not be drawn randomly from the total population. 
Instead, they would be people who value their time relatively highly, have the 
least tolerance for pain, or face the longest waits, or some combination of all 
three. Notice that all three factors—time value, intolerance for pain, and long 
waits—are the largest contributors to the loss from rationing by waiting. %us, 
these proposed changes would solve a large part of the problem. 
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Moreover, allowing people to spend their own money on medical care 
would permit people like the aforementioned Bill Murray, whom the system 
turned down on grounds of age for the treatment he desired, to have another 
alternative: they could buy health care on their own. 
A two-tier system? 
But wouldn’t my proposed solution lead to a “two-tier” medical system?⁶ First, 
that train has already left the station. Canada already has a two-tier system. 
On the top tier are military personnel, the RCMP, prisoners, and Workers’ 
Compensation claimants (Jacobs, ). All are exempt from the Canada 
Health Act. More important, the changes I propose would create a thousand-
tier medical system, just as we have a thousand-tier auto system, food system, 
housing system, and almost every other kind of system. Even people with the 
same income and wealth often spend very different amounts on cars and food. 
%e same would be true of health care. Different people, even with similar 
wealth and income, put different values on health care. Allowing them to 
spend their own money would allow them to express their desires for health 
care in a tangible way, just as they now express their desires for food, clothing, 
cars, and housing in tangible and different ways. 
Would the poor and less-wealthy people bene"t? 
It seems clear that wealthier people would benefit from their ability to buy 
medical care. But what about poor and less-wealthy people? Would they ben-
efit? %e answer is probably yes, for two reasons.
First, the stereotype that non-wealthy people are unwilling or unable to 
pay for health care is false. Just as some non-wealthy people are sometimes will-
ing to pay for a nice car or for expensive meals, so also they would sometimes 
be willing to pay for health care. %e ability to buy medical care directly or to 
buy medical insurance gives them a new option that they did not have before. 
When you give people new choices in addition to the old ones, you don’t make 
them worse off; you make them better off, or at least as well off as before. To the 
 See Lewis, Donaldson, Mitton, and Currie, :  for the claim that allowing doctors to serve 
private patients while not opting out of the government system could lead to “two tier service”.
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extent that they exercise their option to buy medical care or health insurance, 
they show by that choice that they are better off. Economists’ fancy name for 
this point is “revealed preference.” Simply by the act of buying medical care or 
medical insurance, they reveal their preference for this new option.
Imagine, for example, that a non-wealthy person who is considered 
old could get a knee replacement for $, and currently, under the single-
payer plan, is unable to get it at all. He might value the added mobility very 
highly. Indeed, he might even be able to make up the $, by working 
longer hours at a job that pays $ an hour or $ an hour after-tax. With  
hours of extra work, which is an extra  hours a week for  weeks, he could 
cover the financial cost of the knee replacement. And it is precisely the knee 
replacement that makes those extra hours easier to work.
%e second reason that poor and non-wealthy people would likely 
be better off if people were allowed to pay for private health insurance and 
medical care is that some of the wealthier people would surely take advantage 
of this opportunity. In doing so, they would relieve some of the stress on the 
single-payer system. With a given supply in the single-payer system and a 
reduction in demand, queues would shorten. So even non-wealthy people 
who did not avail themselves of the opportunity to buy private insurance or 
medical care would benefit because of other people who do.
Would inequality of health care increase?
One worry that some people might have (and this relates to the “thousand-tier” 
issue noted above) is that there would be increased inequality in health care 
use. %e idea is that if people could purchase private health care, less-wealthy 
people would not buy much more care but wealthier people would. 
%is certainly could happen and, in fact, is likely to happen. But it’s not 
clear why this is a problem. We must separate the issue of well-being from the 
issue of inequality. As noted above, if wealthier people buy more health care, 
the queue for single-payer health care will fall. %at increases availability of 
care under the public system for people who don’t buy private health care and 
rely totally on the single-payer system. If our concern is access to health care 
for the poor and less-wealthy, we can relax because they will get better access. 
In judging my proposed solution, therefore, the issue of inequality in 
health care is a problem only if inequality matters per se. But life is not a race 
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unless you choose to make it so. What’s important is that people get good 
health care, and if getting good health care means that some get excellent 
health care versus all getting so-so health care, it’s worth it. Everyone is bet-
ter off. Notice that even the strongly egalitarian US president, Barack Obama, 
always pitched his health care reform on the basis of its providing more care 
to lower-income people, not on the basis that it would provide equal care.
What about competition for scarce medical resources?
%ere is one reason that people might worry that inequality in health care 
provision would lead to worse care for the less-wealthy. If the amount of 
health care is fixed, then if the wealthier people get more medical care, the 
less-wealthy people would necessarily get less. But to say that the amount of 
medical care is fixed is to say that the supply curve for medical care is per-
fectly inelastic, that is, vertical. Another way of saying that the supply curve is 
perfectly inelastic is that when demand increases, the amount supplied stays 
exactly the same. 
Is a perfectly inelastic supply curve plausible? No, it is not. Indeed, 
the supply of medical care is likely to be fairly elastic. %at is, if the demand 
increased, not only would doctors and hospitals be paid more, but also this 
additional pay would attract more doctors and hospitals. Everyone under-
stands that when Canada’s population increases, the available amount of steak, 
wine, pasta, cars, and toilet paper increases. %e reason is that the increase in 
demand draws more resources into producing more of the things that people 
want. %e same is true for an increase in the demand for medical care.
If people were allowed to buy medical care or health insurance, the 
resulting increase in demand would not, therefore, simply take medical 
resources that otherwise would be available in a single-payer system. Instead, 
under my proposal, there would be more resources in the medical care system. 
Crunch all you want: We’ll make more
How many more resources would be drawn into the medical care system? %e 
answer to that question depends on two variables: ) the increase in demand 
due to people’s new ability to buy health care, and ) the elasticity of supply 
of medical care.
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Consider an extreme case in which the elasticity of supply is infinite. 
In laymen’s terms, this means that even a tiny price increase for doctors, 
nurses, and hospitals would lead to a huge increase in the number of doctors, 
nurses, and hospitals. In this extreme case, all of the additional medical care 
demanded would be satisfied without any loss of resources to the single-payer 
system. One is reminded of the late s ad for Doritos in which comedian 
Jay Leno says, “Crunch all you want; we’ll make more” (YouTube: http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=OCX2H2EgHxY&NR=1).
While the extreme case of infinite elasticity of supply is unlikely, some-
thing very close to it is quite likely. %e reason is that medical care is less 
like coal mining and more like Doritos. If the demand for coal increases, the 
increased price will lead to more coal production, but this coal production, 
absent a technological improvement in mining coal, will cause the price to 
be higher because the only way to get more coal, unless new deposits are 
found, is to go deeper—and that is expensive. But if the demand for Doritos 
increases, the increased demand causes more Doritos to be produced with 
nary an increase in the unit cost of production. Similarly, an increase in 
demand for medical care would lead to more hospitals being built and more 
people becoming nurses and doctors at a fairly constant unit cost over time.
One might think that a substantial increase in demand for medical 
care would not cause a substantial increase in the number of nurses and doc-
tors. After all, the number of slots in nursing schools and medical schools is 
fixed in the short run, and it takes time to build and equip hospitals and other 
medical facilities.
While this concern is clearly relevant, it should be noted that this fixity, 
at least in the longer run, is due to government policy. In Canada, govern-
ments provide the majority of the funds for all  medical schools (Gray and 
Ruedy, ; and Paris, Devaux, and Wei, ).⁷ Hence the number of slots 
in those schools is indirectly the result of a policy decision by the government. 
Of course, there is also the possibility of attracting more doctors and nurses 
through immigration, something that Canada, an attractive country to move 
to with a lot going for it, is already doing. If more doctors and nurses do not 
immigrate to Canada in response to an increase in demand for doctors and 
nurses, this, just as in the school-slot case, is due to government policy.
 I thank Bacchus Barua for these references.
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Government policy can be changed. First, the government could fund 
an increase in the number of slots in medical and nursing schools while insist-
ing that all those admitted, or, at least all those admitted to the additional slots, 
pay all or a large part of their own way. Second, the government could further 
relax its immigration restrictions on doctors and nurses. Finally, even though 
foreign doctors can immigrate to Canada, they often find that they need to 
start almost from square one to be allowed to practice medicine in Canada. 
So, third, this could be altered so that someone with a license to practice in 
another country could be automatically allowed to practice in Canada as 
long as his or her specific degree were prominently displayed in the doctor’s 
waiting room and in all the doctor’s advertising. %ese three measures would 
likely make the supply of doctors and nurses quite elastic. 
Indeed, one can imagine a grand bargain here where doctors and 
nurses would go along with relaxing the restrictions on supply, which would 
increase competition from the entry of new doctors and nurses, in return for 
the increased demand for their services that would occur if the government 
allowed people to buy medical care and private health insurance. Both poli-
cies—allowing people to buy medical care and allowing increased supply—are 
desirable on their own. Implementing them together would even be more 
desirable and, possibly, more politically feasible.
Would there be “cream-skimming?”
Another concern that some might have with allowing people to pay for medi-
cal care is that the “good” doctors would be encouraged to spend more time 
taking care of private payers while the “bad” or less-good doctors would stay in 
the Medicare system. %e fear is that those patients who stick with Medicare 
would get less-good treatment. 
%is could happen. It’s very hard, though, to measure quality in health 
care. %ere are two possibilities. %e first is that there’s nothing to this argument 
and cream-skimming would not occur. %e second is that there’s something to 
this argument and cream-skimming would occur. In the first case, the discus-
sion is over. In the second case, the argument has just begun. Two effects would 
offset the decline in quality under Medicare, making it plausible that people in 
the Medicare system would get better treatment than they would have gotten 
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had private payment been restricted, even if the cream-skimming concern is 
valid. First, as noted earlier, with the queue for health care being shorter, people 
in the Medicare system would get care more quickly. Second, to the extent that 
doctors and hospitals have an incentive to give high quality in return for pri-
vate payments (which is the cream-skimming argument), doctors and hospitals 
would have an incentive to get better at what they do so that they, too, could earn 
private payments. In other words, the quality of the whole system would likely 
improve. Moreover, the higher-quality private care would become an external 
benchmark by which to measure Medicare’s results and improve clinical and 
management practices in the public system. %ere is no such baseline today. 
The joint supply problem: Almost a free lunch
Economists are used to thinking that there is no such thing as a free lunch. 
And they are right. %ere are, however, cheap lunches. One I have in mind 
comes about in medical care because of something that economists call the 
“joint supply problem.” %e classic example is leather and beef, which are 
jointly supplied by cattle. Basic economics shows that when the demand for 
leather increases, the price of beef falls. %e reason is that the demand for 
cattle is made up of the demand for leather plus the demand for beef. When 
the demand for leather increases, the overall demand for cattle increases. 
%is added demand for cattle leads to a higher price for cattle, which, in turn, 
causes more cattle to be produced. %e increased number of cattle produced 
leads to more beef being more produced. %e higher amount of beef, com-
bined with an unchanged demand for beef, leads to lower beef prices.
What does this have to do with medical care? Some of the resources 
used in medical care have this “joint supply” aspect. It might be, for example, 
that, given what Medicare will pay for CT scans, doctors and hospitals find 
it profi  to buy only a few CT scanners and run them only a few hours per 
day. However, consider what might happen if people were allowed to pay for 
CT scans. %en, in deciding how many scanners to buy, doctors and hospital 
administrators would realize that to the government payers they could add 
the private payers and make more money by buying more machines. %is 
would result in increased scanning capacity being available to patients in the 
single-payer Medicare system. 
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A case where allowing a market could well have made more CT scans 
available to Medicare patients is the infamous  case in Richmond, Ontario, 
when York Central Hospital Guelph made CT scans available to animals (Daily 
Mercury, ). People in Ontario could not get a scan quickly because they 
were not legally allowed to pay for a CT scan. %at’s because the govern-
ment “cared” so much about people. However, animals were not (and are not) 
covered by Medicare, because the government doesn’t care as much about 
animals. So pet owners were allowed to pay $ to get a scan for their pets 
during hours in which the scanners were not otherwise in use. When this 
“scandal” was discovered, the bureaucracy did what bureaucracies do: it didn’t 
solve the underlying problem but, rather, made it illegal to use the machines 
on pets (Robson, ). 
But what would have happened had the bureaucracy, instead, allowed 
people to buy scans for their pets? We need not speculate because it was 
already happening. John Robson notes, “[A]ccording to the doctor in charge, 
the user fees paid by dogs allowed him to operate the machine longer, thus 
treating more people” (Robson, ). It is even possible that the hospital 
would have made enough money on the CT scanners to justify buying an 
additional one, which would have meant that one additional scanner would 
have been available for humans. Had that happened, Medicare patients would 
have had even more access to CT scans, not less. %us, my conclusion that the 
joint supply problem can lead to, if not a free lunch, at least a cheaper lunch. 
Conclusion: First do no harm
It’s one thing to advocate that the government subsidize people’s health care, 
as Canadian governments do. It’s quite another to advocate that people who 
are dissatisfied with the current system not be allowed to spend their own 
money to try to do better. Whatever other policies one advocates, people 
should be allowed to spend their own money on medical care. Whose body 
is it, anyway?
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